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I. ABSTRACT 
Hedge funds are one of the fastest growing and most controversial segments 
of the financial market.  Most people know very little about hedge funds other than 
that they are the investment vehicle of choice for well-heeled investors – the place 
where the rich put their money in order to get even richer. 
In fact, hedge funds thrive on the lack of knowledge about what exactly it is 
that they do.  Without the ability to keep their trading strategies confidential, hedge 
funds argue they would not be able generate the impressive returns that keep them 
in business. 
And so when the Securities and Exchange Commission, (“SEC” or 
“Commission”), implemented a rule requiring most hedge fund operators to 
register their names and open their books for inspection, it is no wonder that it 
triggered cries of outrage in the industry.  Many hedge fund managers threatened 
to simply move their operations offshore (though it is not clear how many were 
actually prepared to follow through on that threat).  Others took the battle to court. 
The result of one of those legal battles, Goldstein v. SEC was a decision in 
June 2006 by the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, in which the 
court ordered the SEC to scrap the new rule.  The decision effectively allowed 
hedge funds to maintain the anonymity they desired.  That decision and the 
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developments in the law that led to it, are the subject of this paper. 
While the decision represents an important victory for hedge funds, the 
debate about whether hedge funds should be more closely regulated continues in 
Congress and the popular media.  This article outlines recommendations for what 
the SEC or politicians should do in regard to hedge fund regulation. 
These recommendations can best be summarized as “do nothing.”  However, 
if courts were inclined to make such recommendations, it would likely be one the 
Goldstein court would agree with.  Although not central to the decision, it is clear 
that the SEC failed to convince the court that there was much of a compelling 
reason for the new rule on hedge funds because none of the dangers that the SEC 
warned about actually materialized. 
Following a brief introduction to the relevant securities laws, this paper 
examines the development of the specific law at issue in Goldstein.  It then 
examines the arguments that each side made and analyzes the outcome.  The paper 
concludes with recommendations that I believe stem directly from the court’s 
finding and the logic that underlies it. 
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II. INTRODUCTION 
By any measure, hedge funds have become some of Wall Street’s biggest 
players.  Hedge funds now control some $1.4 trillion in assets, up from $240 
billion in 1998,1 when the near-collapse of Long-Term Capital Management 
(“LTCM”) threatened the global financial system and first raised serious concerns 
about the lack of oversight of hedge funds.  Today, hedge funds are behind more 
than one in every four stock trades2 and they are wielding increasing and often 
over-sized influence on public companies.3 
 
 
 
Graph 1: Growth in Hedge Funds 
 
Despite this tremendous growth in size and market influence, hedge funds 
have been largely unregulated by the SEC, the nation’s market watchdog.  And 
now a recent decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit promises 
                                                          
1 Shivani Vora and Mark Gongloff, Hedge-Fund Milestones, WALL ST. J., Jan. 29, 2007, at A14.  
The $1.4 trillion in assets controlled by hedge funds represents 5% of all assets under management in 
the United States. Id. 
2 Id. 
3 See Kara Scanell, Outside Influence: How Borrowed Shares Swing Company Votes, WALL ST. J., 
Jan. 26, 2007, at A1. 
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to extend this immunity from regulatory oversight. 
In Goldstein v. SEC, the court held that the SEC’s so-called Hedge Fund 
Rule, which would have given the SEC greater oversight over hedge funds, was 
invalid because it was arbitrary and in conflict with the purpose of the underlying 
statute in which the new rule was included.4  The decision seems to shut the door 
on any SEC-led move to strengthen oversight of hedge funds and effectively leaves 
it to Congress to decide if increased oversight of hedge funds is needed. 
At the heart of the decision was the court’s interpretation of the definition of 
“client” under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940.5  Before 2006, the SEC did 
not consider investors in hedge funds to be clients of hedge fund advisers.6  Rather, 
only the funds they managed were considered clients of the adviser.7  Because the 
Investment Advisers Act says that advisers who have fewer than fifteen clients do 
not have to register with the SEC, this earlier interpretation of “client” meant most 
hedge fund advisers did not have to register with the SEC.8  The Hedge Fund Rule, 
would have effectively eliminated this exemption for most hedge fund advisers by 
including fund investors in the definition of clients for purposes of the registration 
requirement.9 
This change would have resulted in sweeping changes in the industry.  
Before the SEC implemented the new regulation last year, the only hedge fund 
advisers who registered with the SEC were the relatively small number of hedge 
fund advisers who had fifteen or more client funds, those who advised a registered 
company and/or those who registered voluntarily.10  Registration would have 
required more disclosure of financial information and subjected hedge funds to 
inspections by the SEC.11  Overall, the SEC estimates that fewer than half of hedge 
fund advisers were registered before the hedge fund rule was implemented.12 
To reach its conclusion that hedge fund investors are not clients of fund 
advisers for the purpose of the IAA’s registration requirement, the Goldstein court 
drew heavily from the Supreme Court’s decision in Lowe v. SEC,13 which held that 
while hedge fund advisers owe a direct fiduciary duty to their funds, this fiduciary 
duty does not extend to the people who invest in those funds.14 
                                                          
4 Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873, 883 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 
5 Id.  15 U.S.C. §80 (2006). 
6 Goldstein, 451 F.3d at 876. 
7 Id. 
8 Id.  Also see, Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(b)(3) (2006), which exempts 
from the registration requirement “any investment adviser who during the course of the preceding 
twelve months has had fewer than fifteen clients and who neither holds himself out generally to the 
public as an investment adviser nor acts as an investment adviser to any investment company registered 
under subchapter I of this Chapter ...” 
9 Goldstein, 451 F.3d at 877. 
10 Staff Report To The United States Securities And Exchange Commission, Implications Of The 
Growth Of Hedge Funds, (Sept. 2003), at 22, available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/ 
hedgefunds0903.pdf [hereinafter Staff Report]. 
11 Goldstein, 451 F.3d at 874. 
12 Staff Report, supra note 10, at 22. 
13 Lowe v. Sec. and Exch. Comm’n, 42 U.S. 181 (1985). 
14 Goldstein, 451 F.3d at 880. 
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A. Background: the Development of Hedge Funds and Relevant Securities’ 
Laws 
Before looking more closely at how the court reached this conclusion, it is 
useful to place the dispute in a historical context by briefly examining the 
development of hedge-fund regulations. 
In 1940, Congress enacted two comprehensive acts to regulate markets: the 
Investment Company Act (“ICA”) regulated securities firms and the kinds of 
products they could offer, while the Investment Advisers Act (“IAA”) was a kind 
of rulebook for people who offered investment advice professionally.15  The acts 
aimed to protect investors by regulating any conflicts of interest between securities 
companies and investment advisers, on the one hand, and the investing public on 
the other.16 
The ICA required companies selling securities to register with the SEC,17 
imposed certain disclosure requirements on firms and laid out restrictions on the 
kind of securities they could issue.18  The ICA directs the commission to regulate 
any issuer of securities that “is or holds itself out as being engaged primarily  . . . 
in the business of investing, reinvesting, or trading in securities.”19 
From the beginning, the ICA intentionally left out small investment 
companies.  Specifically, the law, and its attendant registration and disclosure 
requirements, expressly did not apply to companies that did not offer securities to 
the public and had a hundred or fewer owners and investors.20  Most hedge funds 
are exempt from the ICA’s coverage either because of this exception or because 
they accepted investments only from so-called “qualified” or high net-worth 
investors.21  Congress, thus, explicitly and intentionally created a way for hedge 
funds, even if they were not then called that, to fly under the radar of federal 
regulation.  And within a decade after the act went into effect, hedge-fund like 
companies took advantage of this provision and began offering investments free 
from regulation.22 
The IAA, on the other hand, prohibits investment advisers from engaging in 
fraudulent or deceptive business practices.23  The SEC required advisers to register 
under the act, so that it can respond quickly to any complaints about deceptive 
                                                          
15 Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C §80a (1940).  Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 
U.S.C. §80b (1940). 
16 15 U.S.C §80a (1940).  15 U.S.C. §80b (1940). 
17 15 U.S.C. § 80a-8 (2006). 
18 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-14, 80a-18, 80a-22, 80a-23 (2006). 
19 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(7)(a)(1)(A) (2006). 
20 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(1) (2006). 
21 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(7) (2006). 
22 Staff Report, supra note 10, at 5. 
23 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (2006). 
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practices.24  The IAA defines hedge fund advisers as a person who “for 
compensation, engages in the business of advising others, either directly or through 
publications or writings, as to the value of securities or as to the advisability of 
investing in, purchasing, or selling securities . . . .”25 
However, most hedge fund managers will also qualify for an exemption from 
registration under a section of this Act which exempts “any investment adviser 
who during the course of the preceding twelve months has had fewer than fifteen 
clients and who neither holds himself out generally to the public as an investment 
adviser nor acts as an investment adviser to any investment company registered 
under [the Investment Company Act].”26  The SEC had interpreted “client” as 
referring to the partnership or fund-entity itself.27  And so most hedge fund 
managers were exempt because even the largest of them normally managed fewer 
than fifteen funds.28 
In summary, the result of all these exceptions to the Investment Companies 
Act and the Investment Advisers Act is that hedge fund advisers normally don’t 
have to register with the commission and thus are not required to disclose their 
financial conditions or investment positions.29  Hedge funds are also free from the 
kinds of restrictions on investment activities placed on mutual funds and other 
companies that are required to register.  For example, unlike registered companies, 
hedge funds face no restrictions on trading on margin, entering into short sales or 
investing in commodities and real estate.30 
The SEC estimated that less than half of hedge fund advisers, or some 2,500, 
were registered with the Commission as of June 2006 and that about half of those 
registered only after the Commission enacted its Hedge Fund Rule.31 
The landscape for hedge funds remained largely unchanged until 1992 when 
the SEC’s Division of Investment Management recommended expanding the 
private-investment-company exception to the ICA.  Recognizing the important role 
that these investment companies played in raising capital for small business, the 
SEC recommended that Congress revise the ICA to allow even more companies to 
operate free from regulation by creating another exception for investment funds 
held exclusively by so-called “qualified purchasers” or those wealthy investors 
who, because of their wealth and subsequent financial sophistication, did not need 
the ICA’s protections.32  The revision effectively eliminated the one-hundred-or-
                                                          
24 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3 (2006). 
25 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11) (2006).  See also Abrahamson v. Fleschner, 568 F.2d 862, 869-71 (2d 
Cir. 1977) (holding that the general partners of a hedge fund are considered “investment advisers,” 
though the ruling is somewhat ambiguous as to who (or what entities) are considered the clients of the 
general partner/investment adviser). 
26 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(b)(3) (2006). 
27 Goldstein, 451 F.3d at 876. 
28 Id.. 
29 15 U.S.C. 80-a-8, 80a-29 (2006). 
30 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-12(a)(1), (3) and 80a-13(a)(2) (2006). 
31 Christopher Cox, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Testimony Concerning the Regulation 
of Hedge Funds Before the U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs (July 25, 
2006), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/2006/ts072506cc.htm. 
32 Opening Br. of Pet’rs Phillip Goldstein, Kimball & Winthrop, Inc., and 
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fewer-investors-limitation and created an environment for larger, unregulated 
hedge funds. 
Where the ICA cleared a wide path for hedge fund companies to operate 
largely unfettered by regulation, the IAA, as we have seen, created similar 
exceptions for investment advisers, including those who ran hedge funds.  The 
IAA defines investment advisers as persons who “for compensation, engages in the 
business of advising others, either directly or through publications or writings, as 
to the value of securities or as to the advisability of investing in, purchasing, or 
selling securities.”33  Although the IAA stipulates that most investment advisers 
must register with the SEC, the statute carved out an exception from the 
registration requirement for “any investment adviser who during the course of the 
preceding twelve months has had fewer than fifteen clients and who [does not] 
hold himself out generally to the public as an investment adviser.”34  Those who 
qualify for the exemption do not have to maintain detailed transaction records, 
which they must periodically provide to SEC inspectors, or retain a compliance 
officer.35 
This does not mean, however, that advisers who are exempt from the 
registration requirement are completely free from any regulatory oversight.  The 
IAA prohibits any investment adviser from engaging in fraud and applies equally 
to advisers who are required to register and those who are not.36  Courts have 
interpreted this provision of the act to do more than just prohibit fraud.  The 
Supreme Court in SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc. ruled that the anti-
fraud provision establishes a fiduciary duty between advisers and their clients.37  
This fiduciary duty, requires that advisers have a reasonable basis for their 
investment advice and disclose any conflicts of interest to their clients.38 
The Commission helped clarify the extent of this liability for at least one 
class of advisers in 1985 with the adoption of its so-called “safe harbor” rule for 
general partners in an investment partnership.39  The rule says that only the limited 
partnership itself, i.e. the legal entity, is counted as a client of a general partner 
who provides investment advice based on the investment objectives of the 
partnership.40  Notably under this rule, the investors in a limited partnership are not 
considered clients of the general partner and so the general partner’s fiduciary duty 
does not extend to them.41 
Like the creation of an exemption for funds that catered to qualified 
purchasers under the Investment Companies Act, this change to the Investment 
                                                          
Opportunity Partners L.P. at 14-15, Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (No. 04-1434). 
33 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11) (2006). 
34 15 U.S.C.§80b-3(b)(3) (2006). 
35 15 U.S.C. § 80b-4 (2006). 
36 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (2006). 
37 SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 191-92 (1963). 
38 Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, Investment Advisers Act 
Release No. 2333, 69 Fed. Reg. 72,054, 72,054 (Dec. 10, 2004) [hereinafter Adopting Release]. 
39 Goldstein, 451 F.3d at 880. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. 
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Advisers Act also created greater opportunity for hedge funds to operate with 
minimal regulatory oversight.42 
B. The Move to Strengthen Oversight of Hedge Funds 
However, it was not long after these revisions were enacted that the tide 
seemed to turn against hedge funds as regulators and the broader financial 
community began to call for tougher oversight.  The single event most responsible 
for this shift was probably the near-collapse of Long-Term Capital Management in 
1998. 
The fund was founded just four years earlier by the former head of bond 
trading at Salomon Brothers who put together an impressive team of financial 
gurus.  Following a series of misplaced and highly-leveraged bets, the fund faced a 
life threatening credit crunch.43  Widespread concerns that the fund’s sudden 
collapse might threaten the stability of the global financial system prompted the 
Federal Reserve to orchestrate an emergency $3.6 billion bailout by a consortium 
of Wall Street firms including Goldman Sachs & Co.44 
Just how much of a threat to financial markets a collapse would have been 
was the subject of some debate.  Nonetheless, the incident prompted creation of a 
series of high-level study groups to consider what could be done to insure that a 
small group of investors would not be able to easily upset global markets.45 
The result was calls for greater scrutiny of secretive hedge funds, and a series 
of discussions of regulatory changes culminating in the SEC’s issuance of its 
Hedge Fund Rule.46 
The SEC proposed the rule in July 2004 to address a lack of basic 
information about hedge fund advisers and the hedge fund industry.47  The rule 
imposed the registration requirement on virtually all hedge fund advisers.48 It 
accomplished this by requiring advisers to a private fund to count shareholders in 
that fund as clients, for the purposes of determining whether the adviser qualifies 
for the registration exemption.49  That is, instead of counting only the fund itself as 
a client, advisers had to count anyone who had a stake in the fund.50  Because most 
hedge funds have more than fifteen investors, the result was that the vast majority 
                                                          
42 17 C.F.R. § 275.203(b)(3)-1(a)(2) (2007). 
43 Vora and Gongloff, supra note 1. 
44 Id.; Jacob M. Schlesinger and Michael Schroeder, Greenspan Defends Long-Term Capital Plan: 
More Threats Lurk in Market, Fed Chairman Testifies; Lawmakers are Critical, WALL ST. J., Oct. 2, 
1998, at A3. 
45 Adopting Release, supra note 38, at 72,058 
46 Id. 
47 Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, Investment Advisers Act 
Release No. 2266, 69 Fed. Reg. 45,172, 45,177 [hereinafter Proposing Release] (July 28, 2004). 
48 Goldstein, 451 F.3d at 877. 
49 Id. at 45,183. Specifically, the new rule said that for purposes of the Investment Advisers Act 
“you must count as clients the shareholders, limited partners, members, or beneficiaries ... of the fund.” 
Adopting Release, supra note 38, at 72,088. 
50 This is a so-called “look-through provision” designed to allow the commission to look through 
the legal edifice to investors in order to establish regulatory oversight.  See Adopting Release, supra 
note 38, at 72,073, 72,075. 
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of hedge fund advisers no longer qualified for the registration exemption.51 
Under the new rule, private funds were explicitly defined as investment 
companies that are exempt from regulation under the “fewer-than-100-
shareholders” or the “qualified-purchasers” exemption—the precise exemptions 
under which most unregulated hedge funds were operating.52 
The SEC said the rule was necessary because of three recent changes in the 
hedge fund industry: first, the rapid growth of the industry over the previous 
decade; second, an increase in fraud by hedge funds; and third, a broadening of the 
types of investors who were investing in hedge funds.53 
The rule went into effect on February 10, 2005 and advisers who were 
required to register because of the change must have done so by February 1, 
2006.54 
Of course, the new rule was not popular among hedge funds, which were 
required to add compliance officers and divulge more information about their 
funds.55 
C. The Dissent to the Hedge Fund Rule 
The rule also did not have universal support even within the SEC.56  Notably, 
two of the five commissioners dissented to the rule.57  The dissenters said the new 
rule marked a departure from the Commission’s established approach of 
determining whether a client relationship exists by examining whether or not an 
adviser tailored his investment advice to the objectives of the individual investor.58 
The argument of the dissenters, was very similar to the argument that 
Goldstein used to challenge the new rule. The two Commissioners who opposed 
the new rule wrote a detailed and sharply-worded dissent in which they began by 
pointing out that the new regulation was adopted amid strong opposition from a 
large and diverse group of financial-system professionals and observers.59 
The dissenters cited a litany of reasons why they believed the rule was ill-
advised.  Broadly speaking, their complaints fell into three categories: (1) that 
there were alternative ways to get information about hedge fund advisers short of 
imposing a mandatory registration requirement,60 (2)  that the SEC’s stated reasons 
                                                          
51 Sue Ann Mota, Hedge Funds: Their Advisers Do Not Have to Register with the SEC, But More 
Information and Other Alternatives Are Recommended, 67 LA. L. REV 55, 56 (2006). 
52 Proposing Release, supra note 47, at 45,184 n.138. 
53 Id. at 45,174-75,178. 
54 Adopting Release, supra note 38 at 72,054. 
55 Troy A. Paredes, On the Decision to Regulate Hedge Funds:  The SEC’s Regulatory Philosophy, 
Style, and Mission, 2006 U. Ill. L. Rev. 975, 988-89 (2006). 
56 Adopting Release, supra note 38, at 72,089. 
57 Id. 
58 Id. at 72,097 n.94. 
59 Adopting Release, supra note 38, at 72,089 (citing newspaper editorials opposing the new rule in 
the New York Times, Wall Street Journal, and Washington Post). See Hands off Hedge Funds, WASH. 
POST, at B6, July 18, 2004; Reforming Hedge Funds, N.Y. TIMES, at D12, June 27, 2004; The SEC's 
Expanding Empire, WALL ST. J., at A14, July 13, 2004. 
60 Adopting Release, supra note 38, at 72,089. 
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for the rule, retailization of hedge funds and rampant fraud, were a pretext because 
there was no indication that either was actually occurring61 and finally, (3) that the 
SEC’s already limited resources will be further stretched to conduct examinations 
of hedge funds.62 
In regard to the first point, the dissenters argued that “the needed information 
about hedge funds can be obtained from other sources, including other regulators 
and market participants, as well as through a notice and filing requirement. The 
Commission should have collected and analyzed the existing information and 
determined what new information would be useful before imposing mandatory 
registration.”63 
The most critical language of the dissent was used when they argued that the 
SEC’s rationale for the new rule did not withstand scrutiny.64  According to the 
dissenters, the Commission’s staff 
. . . found that fraud was not rampant in the hedge fund industry, and that 
retailization was not a concern. Nonetheless, the majority repeatedly asserts that 
these issues justify imposition of the rulemaking. The fallacy of the majority’s 
approach is apparent when one notes that registration of hedge fund advisers would 
not have prevented the enforcement cases cited by the majority, and the rulemaking 
will have the perverse effect of promoting, rather than inhibiting, retailization.65 
As for diverting the resources of the SEC, the dissenters argued that “under 
this rulemaking, the Commission will have to allocate its limited resources to 
inspect more than 1,000 additional advisers.”66  What’s more, the dissenters said 
their concerns were validated when shortly after the rule was enacted, the SEC 
began talking about shifting resources from oversight to small advisers in order to 
conduct the duties created under the new regulation.67  The dissenters argued that 
“this possible shift should have been raised during the open meeting and weighed 
by the Commission in deciding whether to adopt the rule.”68 
D. Development of the Law: .Interpretations of the Term “Client” in 
Securities Law 
Until the SEC adopted its Hedge Fund Rule, the term “client” had been 
undefined in both the Investment Advisers Act and the Investment Companies Act.  
The Supreme Court of the United States addressed this question in 1985 in Lowe v. 
SEC, an appeal of an injunction against publication of an investment newsletter by 
a group of former investment advisers whose registrations had been revoked by the 
                                                          
61 Id. at 72,089-90. 
62 Id. at 72,090. 
63 Id. at 72,089 (emphasis added). 
64 Id. 
65 Id. at 72,089-90. 
66 Id. at 72,090. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. 
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SEC.69  The petitioners argued that they should not be prohibited from publishing 
their newsletter because in doing so, they were not acting as investment advisers 
because they were not offering personalized investment advice but rather only 
generalized advice.70 
The Supreme Court agreed, holding that the Investment Advisers Act was 
designed to apply to “those who provide personalized advice attuned to a client’s 
concerns, whether by written or verbal communication.”71  Although the court in 
Lowe did not specifically offer a definition of the term “client” for the purposes of 
the Advisers Act, the holding outlined the requirements for finding the existence of 
an adviser-client relationship.72  The court wrote, 
the mere fact that a publication contains advice and comment about specific 
securities does not give it the personalized character that identifies a professional 
investment adviser. Thus, petitioners’ publications do not fit within the central 
purpose of the Act because they do not offer individualized advice attuned to any 
specific portfolio or to any client’s particular needs.73 
In particular, the court held that an adviser-client relationship requires the 
exchange of direct, personalized advice when it found that “fiduciary, person-to-
person relationships . . . are characteristic of investment adviser-client 
relationships.”74 
Few, if any, other cases have interpreted the particular language at issue in 
Goldstein, that is, the meaning of the word “client” under the Investment Advisers 
Act.  However, there is a rich vein of cases dealing more generally with how to 
interpret the meaning of terms in statutes. 
The starting point is usually to look to the statute itself for definitions of key 
terms.  Where the term is not defined, as is the case with the word “client” in the 
Investment Advisers Act, courts will first often seek to determine whether the 
meaning of the term is ambiguous.75  However, the absence of a statutory 
definition does not necessarily render a term ambiguous.76 
One of the basic rules for determining the meaning of statutory terms is that 
the term should be read in the context of the overall statutory scheme, considering 
the problems Congress sought to solve by enacting the particular law.77 
Another fundamental rule of statutory interpretation that courts have relied 
on says that when Congress uses the same term in various parts of a statute, it 
usually has the same meaning throughout.78 
                                                          
69 Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181 (1985). 
70 Lowe, 472 U.S. at 189. 
71 Id. at 208. 
72 Id. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. at 210. 
75 15 U.S.C. § 80b (2006). 
76 See Alarm Indus. Commc’ns Comm. v. FCC, 131 F.3d 1066 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 
77 See PDK Labs. Inc. v. DEA, 362 F.3d 786, 796 (D.C. Cir. 2004); Davis v. Michigan Dep't of 
Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 809 (1989). 
78 See Sullivan v. Stroop, 496 U.S. 478, 484 (1990); Energy Research Found. v. Defense Nuclear 
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On top of these basic rules of interpretation, courts will often overlay 
consideration of whether a regulatory entity’s interpretation of a statute is 
reasonable. Reasonableness usually requires conformity between the meaning of 
terms at issue and the purpose of the regulation as well as consistency with 
previous interpretations.  In Abbott Labs v. Young, the court held that the 
“reasonableness of an agency’s construction depends, in part, on the construction’s 
fit with the statutory language, as well as its conformity to statutory purposes.”79  
In Northpoint Technology, Ltd. v. FCC, the court held that an interpretation that 
represented an unexplained departure from the agency’s prior practice was not a 
reasonable one.80 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. Outline of the Arguments in Goldstein 
 Philip Goldstein, an investment adviser and part owner of a hedge fund, 
argued that the commission misinterpreted the meaning of client and that its 
definition conflicted with other definitions of the term that the SEC itself used in 
other parts of the same Act.81 
Goldstein first argued that the term client was unambiguous as it was used in 
the section on who qualifies for an exemption to the IAA’s registration 
requirement.82 
In the absence of a statutory definition for “client” in the Act itself, Goldstein 
argued that a natural starting point would be a dictionary definition of the term.83  
According to Black’s Law Dictionary, a “client” is “a person or entity that employs 
a professional for advice or help in that professional’s line of work,”84 a definition 
which, Goldstein argued, was not in accord with the Commission’s interpretation 
because, in the case of a hedge fund, it is the fund itself that directly employs the 
adviser, not the investors in the fund.85 
Goldstein argued that Congress intended the term “client,” as used in the 
Act, to mean a person who received personalized investment advice.86  The SEC 
was therefore wrong to interpret “client” as including a hedge fund’s investors, 
Goldstein argued, because investors do not receive personalized investment advice 
from the adviser.87 Specifically, Goldstein highlighted the language of 15 U.S.C. § 
80b-2(a)(11) which defines investment advisers as persons who “advise others, 
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either directly or through publications and writings.”88  In Lowe, the Supreme 
Court held that Congress, by using this language, intended that “fiduciary, person-
to-person relationships” were “characteristic of investment adviser-client 
relationships.”89  Goldstein argued that investors who merely bought shares in a 
hedge fund do not have the one-on-one, individualized relationship to an adviser 
that was necessary for there to have been what the Advisers Act would consider a 
client relationship.90 
In addition, Goldstein reasoned that Congress showed a specific intention not 
to regulate hedge funds in both the Investment Advisers Act and the Investment 
Companies Act.91  Although the Investment Companies Act is a comprehensive set 
of laws to regulate the relationship between investment companies, advisers and 
the investing public, Congress, in 15 U.S.C.  § 80a-3(c)(1), (c)(7) chose to 
specifically exclude private investment entities such as hedge funds, Goldstein 
argued.92  What’s more, Congress expanded the kind of companies that would not 
be regulated with its later exemption from regulation for entities owned by 
“qualified purchasers.”93 
Similarly, by providing an exemption from the registration requirement for 
advisers with fewer than fifteen clients while at the same time requiring advisers to 
registered investment companies to register under the IAA, Goldstein argued, 
Congress demonstrated an intention not to regulate hedge fund advisers.94  
Therefore, “the regulatory framework that Congress designed is thus clearly set out 
in the statutes. When a person invests in a private investment entity, there is no 
regulation of the investment entity, its adviser or its security holders,” Goldstein 
contended.95 To that end, Congress did not require the registration of an adviser to 
a private investment entity, such as a hedge fund. 
Goldstein also argued that the definition of “client” under the SEC’s new 
rule was unreasonable because it was inconsistent with the commission’s past 
interpretation of the term and because it created a practical dilemma that Congress 
could not have intended.96 
Goldstein asserts that including hedge fund investors as clients of the fund’s 
investment adviser would create a practical problem because the interests of the 
fund itself would often be in conflict with the interest of individual investors.97  
And an adviser who was expected to maintain a fiduciary duty to both the fund, 
and its investors, would not be able to reconcile those competing interests.98 Such a 
conflict would create an intractable ethical dilemma for an adviser who found the 
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objectives of individual investors at odds with the objectives of the fund as a 
whole, Goldstein argued.99 
B. The SEC’s Argument 
The SEC cited three reasons for the need to regulate hedge funds more 
closely: the rapid growth of hedge fund assets, even after the failure of LTCM; the 
trend toward “retailization” of hedge funds so that ordinary investors were 
becoming increasingly exposed to them and; the increase in fraud by hedge 
funds.100  The SEC argued that against this backdrop, and given that the term 
“client” is not specifically defined in the IAA statute, it had the authority to extend 
the definition to cover hedge fund investors.101 
The SEC pointed out that being exempt from registration meant that hedge 
funds, unlike normal mutual funds, did not have to disclose investment positions or 
their financial condition, either to regulators or even to their own investors.102  
This allowed hedge funds to implement secretive investment strategies. 
The SEC asserted that the IAA itself gave it the authority to make a rule 
interpreting the scope of the registration exemption.103  The Commission relied on 
Section 211(a) of the IAA, which states that the SEC can “make, issue, amend, and 
rescind such rules . . . as are necessary or appropriate to the exercise of the 
functions and powers conferred upon the Commission elsewhere in this 
subchapter,” and, in exercising this authority, to “classify persons and matters 
within its jurisdiction and prescribe different requirements for different classes of 
persons or matters.”104  The SEC also cited Section 206(4) of the IAA, which gave 
it authority to adopt rules that are “reasonably designed to prevent” fraudulent, 
deceptive, or manipulative acts.105 
The SEC argued further that it had the authority to interpret the IAA because 
Congress did not specify how clients should be counted.106  Nothing in the act 
prohibited the SEC from “looking through” an investment fund to count individual 
investors for the purposes of the registration exemption, the Commission argued.  
And because hedge funds did not exist at the time the act was put in place in 1940, 
the commission noted, it is impossible to say now whether Congress envisioned 
the fund itself, or the fund’s investors as clients of the adviser for purposes of the 
registration exemption.107  Thus, the Commission submitted, Section 203(b)(3) is 
ambiguous as to a method for counting clients.108 
Not only has Congress never resolved this ambiguity, the Commission went 
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on, but its subsequent amendments suggest that Congress left open the 
interpretation that hedge fund investors could be counted as clients.109  
Specifically, the Commission pointed to a 1980 revision to Section 203 (b)(3) that 
provided that in the case of a business development company, “no shareholder, 
partner, or beneficial owner . . . shall be deemed to be a client of such investment 
adviser unless such person is a client of such investment adviser separate and apart 
from his status as a shareholder, partner or beneficial owner.”110  The Commission 
argued that such a revision would have been unnecessary had Congress already 
intended that shareholders of such companies could not be considered clients of 
investment advisers.111  Even if the specific type of entity at issue in Goldstein was 
different from the type of entity that was the subject of the 1980 revision, the fact 
that Congress felt compelled to clarify how “clients” should be interpreted there, 
the SEC argued, indicated that it recognized the term’s ambiguity.112  The SEC 
then argued that since it established the term as ambiguous, courts should defer to 
its interpretation of the statute.113 
The SEC dismissed Goldstein’s argument that its interpretation of “client” 
under the Hedge Fund Rule was inconsistent with its interpretation of the term 
elsewhere in the IAA.114  The SEC argued that it interpreted the IAA as allowing it 
to “look through” investment funds in certain circumstances to count investors as 
clients.115  In particular the SEC highlighted its 1985 creation of the so-called Safe 
Harbor Rule, which allowed advisers to count a legal entity as a single client as 
long as his or her investment advice was aimed to satisfy the objectives of the 
entity and not the objectives of its individual investors.116  Although the SEC 
ultimately adopted the approach of allowing advisers to count only their funds as 
clients, the SEC made of point of noting at the time it implemented this rule that 
there were, nonetheless, alternative approaches to counting clients.117  In addition, 
the Commission argued that Congress implicitly acknowledged that the term 
“client” was ambiguous as used in the advisers act.118  The SEC based this 
argument on a 1980 revision to separate section of the IAA and the fact that 
Congress included language in that revision that said explicitly that investors 
should not be counted as clients of advisers under that section.119  If Congress felt 
it was necessary to define how clients should be counted in that section, it must 
have been because it felt the term was ambiguous in the act overall, the 
Commission argued.120 
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The SEC also countered Goldstein’s contention that Congress intentionally 
chose not to regulate hedge funds by creating the private investment company 
exemption in the Investment Company Act.121  Here, the SEC argued that just 
because Congress created an exemption from the registration requirement under 
the IAA for private investment companies with fewer than one hundred beneficial 
owners should not be taken as an indication that Congress also intended to exempt 
hedge fund advisers under the IAA.122  That is, while Goldstein basically argued 
the two acts should be considered together as a comprehensive package of 
regulation of the investment industry, the SEC countered that the acts are 
independent and, thus, an exemption created in one, said nothing about Congress’s 
intention in the other.123 
Finally, the SEC argued that Goldstein’s reliance on Lowe v. SEC was 
misplaced because that case dealt with different issues and the interpretation of a 
different section of the Advisers Act.124  The SEC argued that Lowe dealt narrowly 
with the meaning of the exclusion from the definition of investment adviser in 
section 202(a)(11)(D) of the IAA for “the publisher of any bona fide newspaper, 
news magazine or business or financial publication of general and regular 
circulation.”125  The SEC argued that the court in Lowe did not interpret the 
meaning of the term “client” because that term was not part of the section at issue 
there.126The SEC further argued that the role of publishers was in no way 
analogous to hedge fund advisers because while publishers give investment advice 
through general circulation publications that investors use to make their own 
investment decisions, hedge fund advisers directly manage investments and make 
all investment decisions.127 
C. Analysis of the Arguments 
1. The SEC’s Argument 
The SEC faced an uphill battle to convince the court that the term “client” 
should encompass the shareholders of hedge funds, rather than just the fund entity 
itself, because until the SEC promulgated the Hedge Fund Rule, it embraced the 
latter meaning.128  As the Commission itself wrote earlier, when “an adviser to an 
investment pool manages the assets of the pool on the basis of the investment 
objectives of the participants as a group, it appears appropriate to view the pool – 
rather than each participant – as a client of the adviser.”129 
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Nonetheless, the SEC put forth the argument that because the IAA does not 
define the term “client,” it is therefore ambiguous as to the method of counting 
clients.130  The Commission then relied on Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural 
Resources Defense Council, to argue that, as the nation’s securities regulator, the 
SEC should have the authority to interpret the meaning of any ambiguous terms.131 
The court quickly dismissed this argument, writing simply that: 
There is no such rule of law.  The lack of a statutory definition of a work does not 
necessarily render the meaning of a work ambiguous, just as the presence of a 
definition does not necessarily make the meaning clear.  A definition only pushes 
the problem back to the meaning of the defining terms.132 
The SEC also failed to convince the court that a change in its interpretation 
of the meaning of “client” was necessary because of changes in the industry – 
specifically the rapid growth of hedge funds, increasing retailization and a 
corresponding increase in fraud.133  The court seemed unconvinced of significant 
change, and thus was unconvinced a new interpretation was appropriate. 
The court held that: 
[t]he Hedge Fund Rule might be more understandable if, over the years, the 
advisery relationship between hedge fund advisers and investors had changed . . . 
but without any evidence that the role of fund advisers with respect to investors had 
undergone a transformation, there is a disconnect between the factors the 
Commission cited and the rule it promulgated.”134 In the absence of a compelling 
change in the “nature of investment adviser-client relationships,” the court says the 
SEC’s choice of definition “appears completely arbitrary.135 
It seems the court was probably correct to be skeptical of the SEC claims of 
dramatic changes in the industry.  After the ruling was handed down, SEC 
chairman Christopher Cox conceded in testimony to Congress that there was, in 
fact, little indication that the feared “retailization” of hedge funds had occurred.136 
The SEC also failed to make a convincing argument for why the court should 
ignore traditional statutory construction.137.  The court seemed wholly unmoved by 
the SEC’s argument that the Hedge Fund Rule amended only the method for 
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counting clients and did not alter the obligations owed by an investment adviser to 
its clients, holding that “we ordinarily presume that the same words used in 
different parts of a statute have the same meaning.”138 
The SEC opened itself up to contradiction by promulgating the Safe Harbor 
Rule, while the language of that revision, theoretically, left open the possibility of 
counting investors as clients, the SEC in fact, chose to do just the opposite and 
leave investors out of the definition of “clients.”139  That decision only seems to 
support the idea that, for the sake of consistency, the term client elsewhere in the 
act should also not be extended to include investors. 
The holding also emphasized the lack of a clear settled definition of hedge 
fund, saying that  “hedge funds” are notoriously difficult to define.140  The term 
appears nowhere in federal securities laws, and even industry participants do not 
agree upon a single definition.”141  Although the court never explicitedly stated 
why this is a problem, surely, the fact that the SEC, in the court’s view, never 
clearly defines a hedge fund contributed to the sense that the new rule was 
arbitrary.142 
2. Goldstein’s Argument 
In short, the case was not so much won by Goldstein as it was lost by the 
SEC.  Goldstein relied to a large extent on the argument that the Supreme Court’s 
Lowe decision applied here. The SEC made a strong argument that Lowe could be 
distinguished because its holding was limited to the issue of when a publisher is 
considered an investment adviser.143 
The Lowe ruling quite likely would not have been an impenetrable barrier 
had the SEC presented a stronger case for why it should be allowed to change its 
interpretation of “client.”  The court said as much when it wrote “because [the 
Lowe court] was construing an exception to the definition of “investment adviser,” 
we do not read too much into the Court’s understanding of the meaning of 
‘client’.”144 
The court pointed out that the main thrust of Goldstein’s argument was 
simply that the commission misinterpreted the Advisers Act.145  The court is 
ultimately convinced, as Goldstein argued, that “Congress did not intend 
‘shareholders, limited partners, members, or beneficiaries’ of a hedge fund to be 
counted as ‘clients.’”146 
Goldstein made this argument largely by appealing to the court’s common 
sense.  In fact, the court went on to articulate what seemed to a common-sense 
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interpretation of what Congress must have meant by the term “client” in the act 
when it writes: 
an investor in a private fund may benefit from the adviser’s advice (or he may 
suffer from it) but he does not receive the advice directly.  He invests a portion of 
his assets in the fund.  The fund manager – the adviser – controls the disposition of 
the pool of capital in the fund.  The adviser  does not tell the investor how to spend 
his money; the investor made that decision when he invested in the fund.  Having 
bought into the fund, the investor fades into the background; his role is completely 
passive.  If the person or entity controlling the fund is not an ‘investment adviser’ 
to each individual investor, then  a fortiori each investor cannot be a ‘client’ of that 
person or entity.  These are just two sides of the same coin.147 
Goldstein made another kind of appeal to common-sense when he argued 
that surely Congress could not have intended to create the conflict that naturally 
would arise if an adviser were deemed to have a fiduciary duty to both his fund and 
to the investors in that fund.148  Such a conflict, Goldstein argued, would surely 
result if the SEC interpreted the term client to encompass fund investors.  The 
court again seemed to latch on to this argument when it wrote 
if the investors are owed a fiduciary duty and the entity is also owed a fiduciary 
duty, then the adviser will inevitably face conflicts of interest.  Consider an 
investment adviser to a hedge fund that is about to go bankrupt.  His advice to the 
fund will likely include any and all measures to remain solvent.  His advice to an 
investor in the fund , however, would likely be to sell.  For the same reason, we do 
not ordinarily deem the shareholders in a corporation the ‘clients’ of the 
corporations lawyers or accountants.149 
3. Impact of the Decision 
Although, under Chairman Christopher Cox, the SEC decided not to appeal 
the Goldstein decision, that does not mean the SEC has given up the battle to 
tighten regulation of hedge funds.  Shortly after the ruling was announced, 
Chairman Cox announced two new proposed changes to the IAA designed to 
protect hedge fund investors.150  First, the Commissioner said the SEC intended to 
raise the minimum amount of assets an individual investor would be required to 
have to invest in hedge funds.151  The SEC would raise the minimum amount to 
qualify as a so-called accredited investor under Regulation D from one million to 
2.5 million in assets..152 
The SEC based its recommendation on research that showed that many more 
U.S. households are eligible to invest in unregistered investment funds today than 
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were eligible at the time these rules were put in place more than two decades ago.  
The research found that some 8.47 percent of U.S. households qualified to invest in 
hedge funds under the current definition of accredited investor, compared to 1.87% 
at the time the rule was introduced in 1982.153  Raising the minimum-asset number 
to $2.5 million would reduce the percentage of households eligible to invest to just 
1.3 percent, just below the percentage of households that qualified under the 
current rule when it was first established.154 
Second, the SEC has proposed a tougher anti-fraud statute aimed at hedge 
fund advisers, whether they are registered or not.155  The SEC seems to believe 
stronger anti-fraud language will allow it to force advisers to “look through” their 
funds and count investors as clients—essentially the same thing it tried to do with 
the Hedge Fund Rule.156 
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
The first problem the SEC should address, before imposing tougher 
regulations on hedge funds, is to define exactly what kind of entities it has in mind.  
As the Goldstein court correctly pointed out, there is no consensus on the meaning 
of the term hedge fund.157  And unless the SEC establishes clearly what it means 
by the term, any attempt to increase regulation is bound to suffer from the same 
problems identified by the Goldstein court; that is, that any increased regulation 
targeting hedge funds is arbitrary.158 
However, any serious consideration of a definition that includes the 
companies the SEC is concerned about will inevitably not result in any expansion 
of regulation. 
It is generally accepted that the term hedge fund dates from the 1940s and 
originally referred to investment companies that tried to reduce normal market risk 
by “hedging” long stock positions by selling some stocks short.159  However, the 
term is now used in the financial press to refer to any investment company that is 
not registered with the SEC.160 Indexes of hedge funds include everything from 
companies that invest in risky distressed securities to those that maintain market-
neutral positions, so that the term clearly encompasses a wide-range of investment 
strategies and degrees of risk.161 
Since the SEC seems most concerned with keeping small investors from 
becoming exposed to highly-risky hedge funds, an appropriate definition would be 
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one that encompasses unregistered funds that target retail investors with highly-
leveraged, or otherwise risky, investments.162  However, if it were to define hedge 
funds in such a way, no new firms would be subject to registration, which are not 
already required to register.  The investment company rule, discussed above, which 
requires registration of any company offering investments to the public already 
forces firms targeting retail investors to register.163  Moreover, such a definition is 
not likely to increase protections for small investors who might become indirectly 
exposed to hedge funds through their pension funds.  Pension fund managers are 
already required to register and are already regulated by the commission so any 
further protection for investors in this regard would only be redundant.164 
On the other hand, the SEC’s proposal to raise the minimum amount of 
assets needed to be an accredited investor is something the SEC can and probably 
should do.165  $1 million is just not what it used to be, particularly given the rapid 
appreciation in real estate prices over the last decade.  In Southern California the 
price of an average home has more than doubled since 1998 and prices of fairly 
modest homes in nice neighborhoods easily top $1 million.166  How unusual, then, 
would it be for a couple nearing retirement to have $500,000 of equity in their 
home and another $500,000 in retirement savings.167  And so it’s not very difficult 
to envision that a large number of families who might soon qualify as accredited, 
even if they are not necessarily sophisticated investors. 
The SEC proposal to lift the minimum asset requirement to $2.5 million 
would reduce the percentage of households that qualify to very near the level it 
was when the regulation was first implemented, and the additional proposal to 
adjust the number every five years for inflation would insure that the exemption 
would continue to include only the richest investors who are least likely to need 
safeguards.168 
However, it is not clear that the SEC has fully considered other options that 
may achieve the same goal in a more effective way.  Since the main reason that so 
many more households now qualify as accredited investors was the run-up in real 
estate prices, another, relatively simple solution would seem to be to exclude the 
value of one’s primary residence as an asset for the purpose of qualifying.  Such a 
change would eliminate the scenario the SEC seems most concerned with—the 
household of otherwise modest means, which qualifies to invest in hedge funds 
simply by virtue of the fact that the value of their home, a property they may have 
purchases decades ago, has suddenly soared. 
The idea underlying the exemption is that millionaires are normally 
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sufficiently sophisticated in financial affairs to watch out for themselves and even 
if they fail to do so, they can afford to suffer some losses.169  However, a couple 
who has $1 million only because the equity in their home has shot up in the last ten 
years, may not be able to afford much of a loss before they find themselves on the 
street.  Excluding the value of their home, would keep potentially vulnerable 
investors away from hedge funds. 
Commissioner Cox told the senate banking committee last year that he was 
“concerned that the current definition, which is decades old, is not only out of date, 
but wholly inadequate to protect unsophisticated investors from the complex risks 
of investment in most hedge funds.”170  However, a definition of accredited 
investor that eliminated the value of one’s primary residence would go a long way 
toward removing unsophisticated investors from the pool of those eligible to invest 
in hedge funds. 
The SEC has expressed concern that ordinary investors may become exposed 
to hedge funds through pension funds.171  However, this problem too seems more 
speculative than real.  Even if pension funds were aggressively moving into hedge 
funds, which they are not,172 there is no reason to believe the current regulatory 
framework would be unable to deal with such a trend.  Largely, there is not a 
problem when ordinary investors are exposed to hedge funds only indirectly 
through their pension plans because those pension fund managers are required to 
register and any additional regulation of hedge funds would be duplicative and a 
waste of SEC resources.173 Small investors and pensioners are protected by the 
long-recognized duty of managers of pension funds not to expose their fund’s 
beneficiaries to excessive risks.174 
The SEC’s proposal to institute tougher anti-fraud measures also seems 
misguided.175  While such a change does seem to have a greater chance of 
withstanding judicial scrutiny, there is, again, little evidence that it is needed.  The 
SEC already has tough anti-fraud tools and is using them.176  What’s more, while 
the SEC may have limited tools to regulate hedge funds directly it already 
maintains close oversight over counterparties to hedge funds, through which it 
should be able to identify any systemic problems.177 
The commissioners who dissented to the hedge fund rule raised a similar 
argument, relying on no less an authority than the former Federal Reserve Board 
chairman, Alan Greenspan, who stated that: 
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If there [was] a public policy reason to monitor hedge fund activity, the best 
method of doing so without raising liquidity concerns would be indirectly through 
oversight of those broker-dealers (so-called prime brokers) that clear, settle, and 
finance trades for hedge funds. Although the use of multiple prime brokers by the 
largest funds would complicate the monitoring of individual funds by this method, 
such monitoring could provide much useful information on the hedge funds sector 
as a whole.178 
Although the SEC says it is worried about retailization of hedge funds, 
there’s no evidence, beyond the anecdotal, that this is happening.179  The SEC 
chairman himself conceded that the retailization of hedge funds is, so far, just a 
theoretical problem when he told the Senate banking committee last year “[w]hile 
some refer to an alleged growing trend toward the ‘retailization’ of hedge funds, 
the Commission’s staff are not aware of significant numbers of truly retail 
investors investing directly in hedge funds. In my view, such a development, were 
it to occur, should be viewed with alarm.”180 
And while small investors are clearly not buying into hedge funds directly, 
there is also little indication that they have become indirectly exposed through their 
pension funds or mutual funds as public and private pension funds have so far not 
invested heavily in hedge funds.181 
Citing a study by Greenwich Associates, the SEC conceded that 80% of 
public pension funds, and 82% of corporate funds, had made little or no investment 
in hedge funds as of last year.182  The cited report also stated that that those 
corporate and public pension funds that did invest in hedge funds allocated an 
average of only about 5% of their assets to them.183  Such numbers indicate that 
even the indirect exposure of most small investors to hedge funds is small to non-
existent. 
The SEC expressed greater concern about increasing exposure of 
endowments to hedge fund, but here too the numbers are far from alarming.184  
The report found that about one-third of endowments did not invest in hedge 
funds.185  The nearly two-thirds that did invest in hedge funds, allocated an 
average of 18% of their assets to them.186  While this number clearly shows greater 
exposure to hedge funds by endowments, there is also very little reason to be 
concerned by it because the financial fate of endowments will rarely have any 
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impact on small, unsophisticated investors. 
Before imposing stringent registration requirements on pension funds, the 
SEC should consider whether there is not a middle ground approach under which it 
could get more information about the size and growth of funds, while at the same 
time allowing hedge funds to keep their trading strategies secret. 
Many hedge funds argue that revealing information about investment 
strategies and techniques would violate their intellectual property rights and put 
them at a disadvantage.187  One compromise that has been suggested during 2004 
Senate hearings on hedge funds was to allow hedge funds to remain exempt from 
audits so that they could keep trading strategies confidential, in exchange for funds 
agreeing to give the SEC any information it needed to track the size and general 
direction of hedge fund activity.188  This is a common-sense solution that would 
allow hedge funds to maintain their trade secrets while at the same time giving the 
SEC most of what it seeks. 
In short, the SEC’s hedge fund rule was a fix for a system that is not broken.  
The alleged retailization of hedge funds and the rampant fraud that the SEC 
claimed as the basis for the rule, have not transpired.189  And in many ways, the 
common notion that hedge funds are unregulated is also largely a myth. 
The fact that hedge fund companies and advisers are exempt from the 
registration requirements does not mean that they are free to do whatever the 
please.  As SEC Commissioner Cox himself pointed out following the ruling, 
notwithstanding the Goldstein decision, hedge funds today remain subject to SEC 
regulations and enforcement under the antifraud, civil liability, and other provisions 
of the federal securities laws. We will continue to vigorously enforce the federal 
securities laws against hedge funds and hedge fund advisers who violate those laws. 
Hedge funds are not, should not be, and will not be unregulated. 190 
And so, ultimately, the Goldstein decision may represent a victory of the 
common-sense notion of, don’t fix it if it isn’t broken. 
A. Recent Developments 
At the time of this writing, Congress was continuing to hold hearings about 
hedge funds and whether they should be subjected to more stringent regulation.  In 
early March 2007, Senator Charles E. Grassley, Republican of Iowa, tried to slip 
an amendment requiring registration for hedge funds into a Homeland Security 
bill, but the idea was rejected before coming up for a vote.191 
The failure of that bill was part of what appears to be waning enthusiasm for 
more stringent regulations of hedge funds as the warnings about the risks of 
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ordinary pensioners losing their life savings to savage hedge funds grow noticeably 
less dire.192  A month before Sen. Grassley’s amendment died on the vine, a key 
advisery group recommended against implementing measures to strengthen 
regulation of hedge funds. 193 
In what The Wall Street Journal dubbed a welcome call to inaction, the 
President’s Working Group, made up of the heads of the SEC, the Federal Reserve, 
the Commodity Futures Trading Commission and the Treasury, concluded that any 
systemic risk from hedge funds could be best addressed by continuing to closely 
monitor their counterparties, including banks and brokerages.194  The long-awaited 
report also said the SEC’s move to raise minimum asset requirements for hedge 
fund investors would work well to protect unsophisticated investors.195  Calls for 
increased regulation of hedge funds have waned amid a widespread concern that 
U.S. capital markets are losing their competitive edge over other money centers 
such as London, Hong Kong and Shanghai due, at least in part, to excessive 
regulation.196 
Perhaps another reason the drive to impose tougher regulations on hedge 
funds is losing steam is that many of the funds themselves are not the high-fliers 
they once were.  Last year, the average hedge fund generated a return of just 
12.9%, lower than the market as a whole, according to Hedge Fund Research 
Inc.197  Such earthly returns probably raise fewer alarm bells for those worried 
about what kind of investments hedge funds are making. 
This is not to say that voices calling for tougher regulation have been 
completely drowned out.  While anti-regulation sentiment seems to be on the rise 
in the United States, that is not necessarily true elsewhere.  Finance Minister Peer 
Steinbrück of Germany, which currently holds the presidency of the Group of 
Seven industrialized nations, has been a vocal critic of weak hedge fund regulation 
and has urged the Group of Seven to take up the issue.198 
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